Reference frame definition, use, and interaction in spatial memory by Street, Whitney N
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
© 2017 Whitney N Street
	  	  	  	  	  
REFERENCE FRAME DEFINITION, USE, AND INTERACTION IN SPATIAL MEMORY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
WHITNEY N STREET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
  
 Professor Ranxiao Wang, Chair 
 Professor Daniel J. Simons 
 Associate Professor Diane M. Beck 
 Professor John E. Hummel 
Professor Kara D. Federmeier 
  
	   ii	  
ABSTRACT 
  
 In order to preform actions and reason about spatial relationships in the world, a mental 
representation of spatial locations is needed.  The exact nature of this representation has been 
debated among research groups with some concluding reference frames are self-based 
(egocentric), while others conclude spatial representations are independent from the self 
(allocentric or intrinsic).  This research presents novel methods to assess spatial reference frame 
use in memory.  Chapter 1 presents a framework for classifying reference frames.  Specifically a 
distinction between reference direction and reference point is made. Chapter 2 details a novel 
attraction analysis paradigm to assess reference direction use.  Chapter 3 details a bias 
distribution analysis, which can provide evidence for interacting reference directions.  Chapter 4 
presents a novel way to test reference point use in spatial memory.  Chapter 5 combines these 
findings and concludes that an egocentric reference frame is encoded in memory and used during 
spatial tasks.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 	  
 Throughout the day, we interact with objects in a spatial world.  From picking up 
a cup to remembering the layout of a city, humans have the ability to flexibly use spatial 
knowledge with seemingly little to no effort.  In order to perform these actions, spatial 
information must be stored in a mental representation and the nature of this 
representation has been contested.  One argument could be that the eye sees the world 
from the viewer’s perspective, egocentrically, and therefore mental representations likely 
also follow that structure.  However, the brain does not passively take in knowledge and 
instead it actively interprets the signals it encounters.  Since this is the case, it is possible 
that spatial representations are independent of the viewer, i.e., allocentric or intrinsic. 
 To understand how people accomplish spatial tasks, a deeper understanding of the 
structure of a spatial representation is necessary.  Spatial locations are inherently relative.  
For example, the same location might be referred to as 3.5m in front of the building, .5m 
to the left of you, or 40°06'28.1"N 88°13'47.8"W.  To identify this location, each of these 
statements make use of a different reference frame which provides the structure for 
remembering and communicating locations as well as acting in a spatial world.  
Additionally, different reference frames are best suited for different tasks.  While map-
based applications can quickly and accurately use longitude and latitude to find any 
location on Earth, a person reaching for an object needs the distance and direction of that 
object relative to themselves. Understanding reference frame use in spatial memory is 
critical to understanding how we interact in the spatial world. 
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 Within a reference frame, two components are necessary to fully define locations. 
A reference point specifies the origin of the reference frame.  In the example, the cup is 
to the right of the plate, the plate is used as a reference point. Additionally, a reference 
direction is needed to act as a conceptual ‘north’ for the reference frame. Understanding 
‘to the right of’ assumes knowledge of that reference direction.  With these two 
components, all other locations can be represented as a distance from the reference point 
and a specific angle off the reference direction.   
Research in spatial memory differs vastly on the definition and expected 
performance of different reference frames (Levinson, 1996; Klatzky, 1998).  Furthermore, 
spatial reference frames are rarely fully specified by researchers and terms are often used 
in wildly different ways. Since reference point selection does not theoretically constrain 
reference direction selection and vice versa, generic terms such as ‘self-based’ or 
‘environment-based’ do not specify a reference frame’s full definition.  
Reference frame definitions 
 Generally, two categories of reference frames are posited in spatial memory: those 
based on the self, called egocentric, and those based on the external world, termed 
allocentric (Burgess, 2006; Feigenbaum & Rolls, 1991; Howard, 1991; Klatzky, 1998; 
Levinson, 1996; McNamara, Rump, & Werner, 2003; Wang & Spelke, 2000; Wang, 
2003; Wang, 2012). Often egocentric reference frames are defined as those based on a 
person’s head, body, or hand.  Allocentric reference frames often are defined as a 
representation external to the individual including those based on objects, geometric 
configurations, and any external arbitrary location or perspective.  However, these are 
	   3	  
generic categories of reference frames and a fully specified reference frame definition 
requires more specificity than this alone.  
Since reference point and direction selection are theoretically independent of one 
another, either can be self or externally based.  A reference direction may be based on the 
observer’s facing direction or based on an external direction in the environment.  While 
self based reference directions are likely to be a person’s facing direction or heading, 
external reference directions may be based on the orientation of the room, magnetic north, 
or any other non-self direction.  A further distinction is often made between reference 
directions based on the properties of an object or array of objects, often called intrinsic 
reference direction, and those based on non-object external directions, an environmental 
reference direction.  An intrinsic reference direction is based on the structure of the object 
or array (Levinson, 1996; McNamara, 2003; Mou & McNamara, 2002). That is, the 
object structure has an inherent ‘front’.  Environment-based reference frames encompass 
any other arbitrary reference direction, such as magnetic north or a universally agreed 
upon direction such as an ascending slope (Levinson, 1996).  
Similarly, the origin of the reference frame, the reference point, can also be based 
on the self or an external location. Egocentric reference points are based on the position 
of the observer (Klatzky, 1998; Levinson, 1996).  Allocentric reference points are 
locations external to the self.  There are an infinite number of possible external reference 
points, however some positions may be more likely than others such as landmarks or 
other important places.  Alternatively, instead of a single external reference point, objects 
may be encoded relative to other objects pairwise (McNamara, 2003; Mou & McNamara, 
2002).  Here object A is remembered based on object B and C while B is remembered 
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relative to A and C, and so forth.  This object-to-object encoding means each object is 
remembered relative to each other object in the display and direct recall of these 
relationships is possible from memory. 
 These three possible reference points paired with the three reference directions 
give rise to nine definitions, each of which specify a distinct and potential reference 
frame (see table 1.1). Research generally focuses on ‘egocentric’, ‘intrinsic’, or 
‘allocentric’ reference frames which are categories of reference frames collapse across 
these nine cells.  Though these generic terms are used widely when researching reference 
frames, it is important to remember that without a fully specified definition, experimental 
results may be difficult to interpret.  Additionally, as showcased below, the same term 
can often have completely different meanings across different literatures/researchers so a 
more specified definition is critical for understanding reference frame research. 
Variety of reference frames definitions 	   Spatial	  Language	  
A clear case of this collapsing comes from spatial language (Carlson-Radvansky 
& Irwin, 1993; see table 1.2). When interpreting a statement such as “above the apple”, 
the speaker may wish to convey the ‘above’ relative to herself, gravity, or the object itself 
(see figure 1.1). The intrinsic above would be relative to the stem of the apple. An 
intrinsic reference direction comes from the structure of the object structure (Levinson, 
1996; Palmer, 1989), in this case the stem of the apples give it a natural ‘top’.  
Importantly, not all objects have an intrinsic reference direction, such as a ball.  In cases 
like these, other reference directions may more readily apply. 
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Beyond the intrinsic reference direction, spatial language defines two other 
reference frames, again by focusing only on reference direction while collapsing across 
reference point. Cues from the environment, such as gravity, may be used to define an 
absolute reference frame.  An absolute reference frame may apply to objects with or 
without a clear intrinsic axis.  Therefore “above the apple” can also be labeled with 
respect to gravity disregarding the intrinsic direction. 
Finally, a self reference direction can be applied in spatial language, called a 
relative reference frame.  Here “above the apple” is labeled relative to the observer’s 
body orientation.  When the viewer stands, the relative reference frame aligns with a 
gravity-based absolute reference frame, however the two can conflict such as when an 
observer lies down. In fact all of these reference directions can conflict when they 
misalign (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993; see figure 1.1). 
Spatial Memory 
Unlike spatial language, spatial memory researchers define an intrinsic reference 
frame based on the type of reference point encoded while reference direction may vary 
(see table 1.3).  Here intrinsic encodings are a set of pairwise object vectors (Gibson, 
1979; Sedgwick, 1983; Rieser, 1989; Easton & Sholl, 1995; McNamara, 2003).  
Reference direction on the other hand may vary with a self, object, or environmental 
direction selected.  
Additionally, an egocentric reference frame can be defined as different 
combinations of reference point and direction pairs.  One possible definition is one that 
encoded a person’s viewing direction and position.  Here both the reference point and 
direction are based on the self and all other combinations might be defined as allocentric 
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reference frames.  However, this is not the only possible classification.  The term 
egocentric may be defined as a reference frame that encodes either the reference point or 
direction based on the individual.  Here, self-motion will require the representation to 
update to remain accurate if either the reference point or direction are based on the self 
(Wang, 2012; see table 1.4). By this logic, an allocentric representation is one that 
includes information wholly outside the self which needs no updating after a person’s 
self-motion.  
As is illustrated from the vastly different definitions of reference frames, the 
terms egocentric, allocentric, and intrinsic can describe very different spatial 
representations.  Additionally, support for reference frame use is mixed.  Some of this 
confusion may be due to the differences in defining reference frames however, an 
additional challenge in understanding how reference frames are structured in memory 
comes from the variety and limitations of the tasks used to test spatial memory.  
Egocentric empirical evidence 
It is generally accepted that individuals first engage the world egocentrically.  
Visual information is represented retinotopicly in the retina as well as some cortical level 
of the brain (Colby & Goldberg, 1999).  Additionally, acting on the world requires 
egocentric action vectors for movement.  While allocentric reference frames have been 
posited for intervening cognitive steps between this input and output, there is evidence 
egocentric reference frames persist throughout memory. 
The configuration error paradigm provides a particularly compelling test of 
egocentric vs. allocentric reference frames in spatial memory (Wang & Spelke, 2000).  
Here, egocentric representations are defined as any reference frame that uses the 
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observer’s position as either a reference point or direction because these representations 
must change after self-motion to stay accurate (see table 1.4). To test if individuals can 
represent locations based only on an external reference point and direction, the 
configuration error paradigm assumes that an allocentric reference frame should not be 
affected by disorientation of the observer. That is, after an individual has studied and 
encoded spatial locations, spinning this person until they no longer know where they are 
in a space should be detrimental to object-to-self encodings but not object-to-object or 
object-to-environment encodings. However, if spatial reference frames encode a scene 
egocentrically, this disorientation should affect all spatial recall.  
Two types of error were used to discern what effects the disorientation had on 
performance.  Heading error, measured by the average signed error for each object, 
shows if participants are accurately representing their correct heading.  Disorientation 
should disrupt heading error as participants lose track of their position and therefore 
cannot accurately point to the targets.  Configuration error, calculated as the standard 
deviations of signed errors to each target, shows how individuals represent the internal 
configuration of the remembered items.  A correctly remembered array of objects will 
have no configuration error. However, this error will increase as the structure of the items 
deviates from this configuration. If individuals represented these object relationships 
allocentrically, they will not be able to correctly point directly to the objects, since they 
were disoriented, however, the configuration of these pointing responses should be intact. 
In order to test if spatial representations of a remembered space rely on a person’s 
egocentric position, participants memorized several objects around a room, were 
disoriented, and then pointed to the remembered objects.  Unsurprisingly, heading error 
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increased with disorientation showing that they were indeed disoriented.  More 
interesting is whether individuals preserved the internal configuration of the objects even 
though they had lost their heading. Wang & Spelke (2000) found that disorientation 
increased configuration errors, which provides strong support that an egocentric reference 
frame was used in spatial memory.   
Allocentric empirical evidence 
  Though spatial information enters the brain egocentrically, our brains are capable 
of complex spatial processing. Additionally, allocentric reference frames or ‘mental maps’ 
are often considered a sophisticated form of spatial memory that humans must be capable 
of.  Additionally, subjective experience often feels like an internal enduring map of space.  
To support this theory, complex and difficult spatial task performance is often taken as 
evidence of an allocentric reference frame.  
Early spatial memory research was explained in behavioral terms.  Rats learned 
paths through mazes because of a food reward.  However, Tolman (1948) and other field 
theorists saw more complex behavior than simple reinforcement learning. Generally 
researchers found that hungry rats rewarded with food at a goal location quickly 
decreased the number of wrong turns through a maze to a food source while those with 
no reward did not show learning. However, field theorists found that rats can learn in the 
absence of reinforcement. In a cleaver manipulation, Blodgett (1929) allowed a group of 
rats to run the maze with no food reinforcement for six days.  On the seventh, a food 
reward was added and on the next testing day, the rats’ errors decreased to the level of the 
food reinforced rats.  This striking performance could only occur if the rats had learned 
the maze without food reinforcement so they could improve immediately upon the food’s 
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introduction.  Additionally, this finding suggests that the initial evidence that rats did not 
learn without food was incorrect and even these rats would have shown their hidden 
knowledge of the space if given a goal. 
Tolman (1948) described this phenomenon as latent learning and postulated that 
these rats had formed a cognitive map of the maze. The term ‘map’ suggests that the rats 
were using a reference frame that abstracts away from any viewer-based experience to a 
representation based on the enduring allocentric space. When defining Tolman’s 
cognitive map in terms of table 1.1, an environment reference direction most closely 
represents a map’s use of north as its defined reference direction.  Additionally, object-to-
object encodings, which allow direct retrieval of pairwise object relations, mimic 
studying a map and knowing the locations of any configuration of objects with a single 
look.  However, other definitions of Tolman’s mental map are possible because the 
original definition is underspecified. 
Beyond the term ‘map’, Tolman further concluded that only ‘comprehensive’ 
maps allow an animal to accomplish tasks such as shortcutting to novel locations while a 
‘strip-like’ map would not allow this kind of generalization.  This idea of a 
comprehensive map suggests two propertied of the reference frame.  A comprehensive 
representation should include information broadly about the space and not only that seen 
in a single ‘strip’ of navigating.  Furthermore, a comprehensive representation should be 
able to operate broadly and not only in limited situations. While an allocentric reference 
frame meets these criteria, an egocentric reference frame can also encode this information.  
In particular, an egocentric representation (as defined in table 1.4) can guide navigation, 
and can theoretically store and integrate information from multiple paths.  Therefore, 
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Tolman may have intended a cognitive map to be any spatial representation that broadly 
guides actions meaning all possible reference frames discussed above would qualify as a 
cognitive map. 
More recent research into reference frames makes the distinction between route 
and survey knowledge (e.g., Golledge, Dougherty, & Bell, 1995; Gould, 1986; Landau, 
Spelke, & Gleitman, 1984; Maguire et al., 2003; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982).  
Route knowledge is based on the path an individual takes through a space and does not 
allow shortcutting as the representation only includes elements such as segments, 
intersections, and landmarks along a give route. With experience, route knowledge is 
hypothesized to combine into survey knowledge.  Survey knowledge, similar to Tolman’s 
cognitive map, includes allocentric information about a space which allows individuals to 
shortcut between locations and link routes learned as distinct traversals.  
A route based representation is said to be egocentric suggesting a reference point 
and direction based on the self.  Survey knowledge, gained after many different routes are 
learned, is said to be allocentric and much like cognitive maps may be based on an 
object-to-object reference point and non-object external reference direction. Additionally, 
survey knowledge contains substantially more information about the environment while 
route knowledge is limited to include only information within a single path.  If reference 
frames are constrained in the type of knowledge encoded in survey and route 
representations, novel shortcutting to new locations should distinguish between the two.  
Critically, successful shortcutting should only possible when using survey level 
knowledge.  
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Both animals (Cartwright & Collett, 1982; Griffin & Etienne, 1998; Lehrer & 
Collett, 1994; Müller & Wehner,1988) and humans (Loomis et al., 1993; Mallot & 
Gillner, 2000; Wang & Brockmole, 2003) can take a novel shortcut path to a previously 
experienced position.  For example, adults are able to return to a starting position when 
they are lead along a specific path blindfolded and are then asked to return directly to the 
origin (Loomis et al., 1993; Klatzky et al., 1998).  If this performance is only possible 
with survey knowledge, this is evidence for allocentric representations in human spatial 
memory.  However, shortcutting tasks may not reveal as much about the nature of spatial 
reference frames as originally postulated. Ants and bees are among the many animals 
capable of novel shortcutting (Müller & Wehner, 1988; Cartwright & Collett, 1982; 
Lehrer & Collett, 1994). While it is possible animals with such limited cognitive 
capacities represent comprehensive allocentric maps of their environment, researchers 
generally interpret their success as evidence of path integration, also called spatial 
updating.   
When an ant leaves its home to forage for food, path integration allows the animal 
to remember the location of its nest as a homing vector from its current position to the 
nest (Collett, Collett, & Wehner, 1999).  With each movement, this homing vector is 
updated by adding the new movement vector to the old homing vector.  This process 
therefore provides accurate distance and direction information to guide the ant back to the 
nest regardless of where its travels take it. While shortcutting may be a sign of an 
allocentric reference frame, it can just as easily be interpreted as evidence of path 
integration which can operate over any reference frame (Wang, 2012). 
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Additional evidence of an allocentric spatial representation comes hippocampal 
place cells (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Burgess, Jeffery, & O’Keefe, 1999).  These place 
cells respond when an animal is in a particular location of space regardless of their body 
position.  This activation is interpreted as evidence of the physical instantiation of a 
cognitive map.  Place cells may therefore encode static map-like representations of the 
environment regardless of the individual’s position suggesting an allocentric reference 
frame with neither reference point or direction based on self position (such as in figure 
1.4).  
However, these cells do not simply represent an enduring, allocentric 
representation.  A cognitive map should statically and enduringly represent space while 
not changing based on the observer however, these place cells can shift as the animal 
moves (Wang, 2003).  Therefore these place cells may be encoding relationships between 
distances and locations of the environment egocentrically (Wang, 2012) since the 
hippocampus is important in relational learning (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 1988). This 
alternative interpretation means additional evidence is needed to fully understand how 
these place cells encode a reference frame in memory. 
Judgment of Relative Direction Task 
 The judgment of relative direction task (JRD) is a widely used task that assesses 
spatial representation based on imagined perspective taking (e.g., Shelton & McNamara, 
1997; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Mou & McNamara, 2002; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 
1998).  Participants memorize a scene from one or more viewpoints.  During test, they 
are then asked to make pointing responses from imagined headings.  Some of these 
directions align with the studied viewpoint while others are novel.  In order to identify the 
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imagined heading, instructions are used such as “Imagine standing at X looking at Y, 
point to Z”.  Response time and accuracy are used to measure performance of taking 
particular headings.   
If pointing responses are fast and accurate, then the imagined heading is thought 
to be encoded in the spatial representation. Slower and/or more error prone responses 
suggest the imagined heading required a transformation. When participants are asked to 
perform a heading rotation, their performance is a function of the amount of rotation 
required (Rieser, 1989; Easton & Sholl, 1995).  Therefore, the JRD task relies on the idea 
that this transformational cost must occur when responding to a perspective that is not 
represented in memory. 
Additionally, the JRD task is often assumed to require object-to-object 
relationships (McNamara, 2003; Mou & McNamara, 2002).  JRD responses consist of the 
location of one object relative to another object. Object locations represented relative to a 
specific reference point, such as the self or an external environmental point will require a 
transformation for response in this task while object-to-object encodings can be directly 
retrieved from memory.  An alternative explanation however is possible.  Spatial 
translations, which are an imagined shift in position while maintaining the same heading 
direction, show little processing cost in in response time and errors (Rieser, 1989; Easton 
& Sholl, 1995; see May, 2004 and Wang, 2005 for more careful control of a translation 
task with larger effects).  Therefore translating from a reference point encoding to another 
will not substantially affect pointing responses and the JRD task alone cannot test which 
reference point is used in spatial memory. 
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Reference direction, however, is testable through the JRD task.  Experienced 
viewpoints almost always exhibit better performance than other perspectives (Shelton & 
McNamara, 1997; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Mou & McNamara, 2002; Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al., 1998; Shelton & Yamamoto, 2009). When individuals view a scene from 
a single perspective, they make JRD pointing responses quicker and with less error to 
imagined headings parallel to the learned reference direction.  This orientation dependent 
response suggests that the spatial scene is not represented equally well from all 
orientations.  Furthermore, this finding suggests that the default reference direction in 
spatial memory is egocentric.   
However, not all egocentric viewpoints are equal. When participants viewed the 
space from two different perspectives, one that aligned with the floor and mat (0˚) and the 
other misaligned (135˚) and were then asked to make relative judgments of direction, 
their error was lowest when their imagined heading was parallel to that of the aligned 
orientation regardless of the order the two perspectives were viewed.  However, when the 
aligned and misaligned perspectives were viewed individually, imagined headings to the 
egocentric experience won out (Shelton & McNamara, 2001; experiment 2).  Therefore, 
Shelton & McNamara conclude that while egocentric experience may drive reference 
frame encoding, the aligned reference direction can replace a ‘bad’, misaligned 
egocentric reference direction with a better, aligned egocentric reference direction. 
Beyond the viewed perspective, imagined headings at 90˚ rotations from the 
viewed perspective (90˚, 180˚, and -90˚ in addition to 0˚) often also show performance 
advantages on par with the viewed reference direction (Mou & McNamara, 2002; 
Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 1998; McNamara, Rump, & Werner, 2003). This better 
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performance for aligned vs. misaligned imagined perspectives produces a saw-tooth 
pattern of performance.  This pattern is taken as evidence that the aligned perspectives 
are also encoded in the representation and that this structure comes from the array itself, 
an intrinsic reference frame (Mou & McNamara, 2002; McNamara, 2003).   
As a further test of how dominate this intrinsic representation is, participants were 
asked to study and encode a perspective they never actually saw, an imagined heading 
outside of their own egocentric view.  Their results showed the characteristic saw-tooth 
pattern at the instructed reference direction and showed no evidence of encoding the 
egocentric reference direction at all.  With this evidence, Mou & McNamara (2002) 
conclude that the intrinsic reference direction is the default in spatial memory. Egocentric 
reference directions are then the first of many possible influences, such as room geometry, 
array configuration, and instructions, on final reference frame encoding.  
The evidence for self-based reference directions in the JRD task has shifted over 
time.  Early evidence suggested that egocentric experience guides reference direction 
selection.  Further research suggested that within egocentric experience, views that were 
aligned with an object array were preferred in spatial memory while misaligned angles 
are discarded.  Finally, instructed directions outside of the self seem to be represented in 
spatial memory with no trace of the self-perspective at all. Therefore, findings from the 
JRD task suggest intrinsic reference directions dominate over the egocentric experience. 
Single or Multiple Representations 
 Theoretically, multiple spatial reference frames can exist simultaneously in 
memory.  In fact many theories posit an egocentric system for navigation and an 
allocentric representation for object-to-object relationship encoding (Burgess, 2006; 
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Easton & Sholl, 1995; Rieser, 1998).  Alternatively, spatial memory may include only a 
single spatial representation for all tasks.  When spatial information is needed in a 
different format, say object-to-object encoding for JRD judgments, the reference frame 
can be transformed into another format.  In fact, one of the most difficult problems when 
testing reference frame use is that different reference frames are mathematically 
equivalent under many circumstances (May, 2004). A single representation that can be 
transformed into multiple formats would use less memory while two representations 
would use less processing power during a task.  Either of these representations is possible 
resulting in different speed/storage tradeoffs.  
 Additionally, spatial representations may exist simultaneously due to 
transformations of a single encoded reference frame. When a long term reference frame 
in memory must be transformed, say an egocentric reference frame changed to an object-
to-object pointing response for a JRD task, both the transformed and the encoded 
representations exist in memory during this pointing response.  During this time, the 
more stable encoded representation may interfere with the less stable transformed version.   
 There is evidence for a similar type of interference in spatial memory.  One theory 
for why imagined body rotations are difficult is that the egocentric pointing response 
interferes with the transformed imagined pointing response (May, 2004; Wang, 2005). 
Participants were positioned within the remembered array and then asked to take a 
different perspective either by a translation or rotation.  Their physical body position 
interfered with the imagined pointing response resulting in slower and less accurate final 
responses. Similar interaction effects may occur during other spatial performance tasks 
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such as between a remembered pointing response and a transformed imagined pointing 
response during a JRD task. 
Research Questions 
Researchers often disagree about what constitutes a specific reference frame 
sometimes while using the same terms.  One of the goals of the following research is to 
more clearly discern reference point and direction use in spatial memory.  Additionally, 
this research seeks to understand when self and external reference frames are used and 
how they interact in memory.  If self-based representations exert a strong influence on 
other reference frames, self-based reference point and direction representations should 
occur as a default and influence task performance on any externally based representations.  
Alternatively, external or object based reference frames may be strongly represented in 
memory and bias self based reference frames.  In pursuit of these goals, the following 
chapters test spatial reference direction and point use to better understand reference frame 
encoding in memory. 
Chapter 2 proposes a new procedure based on signed error and an attraction 
analysis to uncover which reference directions are represented in memory. Generally, 
perspective taking tasks rely on the performance measures of response time and absolute 
pointing error to judge which orientations reside in spatial memory however superior 
performance may suggest preferential transformation as well as encoding.  This new 
analysis assumes when a transformation is required, this transformed representation will 
compete with the stored representation so that final responses will be ‘attracted’ to the 
encoded representation.  
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 Chapter 3 studies which reference direction is represented in memory and 
proposes a new method to determine if reference frame interactions lead to biases. 
Egocentric representations are sometimes considered a default reference direction 
(Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Shelton & Yamamoto, 2009), 
however there is evidence that this egocentric reference direction need not be encoded in 
spatial memory when participants are instructed to remember an alternative reference 
direction (Mou & McNamara, 2002; Chapter 2).  To begin, a new method for classifying 
encoded response direction is proposed on the basis of signed error responses. When 
reference direction is held constant, signed errors will cluster around an instructed 
reference direction, which may be encoded or transformed, with some spread due to 
random noise. Therefore this distribution of errors was used to classify which reference 
direction was encoded within memory and if more individuals use self-based or object-
based reference directions. Furthermore, signed errors show systematic bias of a 
reference direction.  Therefore, if either a self or intrinsic based reference direction biases 
the final representation, those correctly representing an instructed perspective will show 
systematic shifts in their signed error distributions.  Therefore this new analysis can both 
confirm that participants are representing a particular perspective and reveal if a 
perspective influences the encoding of others. 
 Chapter 4 tests reference point selection in memory with a variant of May’s 
(2004) interference based approach.   Much of reference frame research focuses on 
reference direction with little research to reference point selection.  Studying reference 
point encoding is difficult because spatial translations to new a new imagined position 
elicit small or no costs on performance (Easton & Sholl, 1995; Rieser, 1989).  Here the 
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disparity between two pointing responses is used as an indicator of reference point 
selection.  This method can directly test reference point selection to both self and external 
based reference points and indirectly tests object-to-object encoding.  Finally Chapter 5 
draws conclusions with this new research in mind.   	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Tables and Figures 	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Table 1.3: Intrinsic Model 
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Table 1.4: Egocentric Updating Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Spatial Language Reference Direction  
Spatial language defines reference frames on the basis of reference direction.  
The object above the apple is the diamond if defined based on the intrinsic 
reference frame, the oval if defined based on the absolute reference frame, 
and the heart can be above in a relative reference frame if a person lies down 
with their head towards the bottom of the apple. 
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CHAPTER 2: REFERENCE DIRECTION ATTRACTION 
ANALYISIS1 
 
 Spatial representations in memory are generally inferred from performance on 
experimental tasks.  The judgment of relative direction paradigm (JRD) tests spatial 
memory first by asking individuals to remember an array of objects from a particular 
perspective (Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Mou & 
McNamara, 2002; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 1998; Rieser, 1989; Simons & Wang, 1998; 
Waller & Hodgson, 2006; Waller, Montello, Richardson, & Hegarty, 2002; Wang, 2007).  
The observer is then tested with a series of relative judgments where she takes an 
imagined heading and judges the location of a remembered object. Generally, instructions 
such as “Imagine standing at X while facing Y, now point to Z” are used to indicate the 
imagined heading and target object for each test. A typical interpretation of JRD results is 
that good performance occurs because pointing locations at some imagined heading are 
directly retrievable from memory while poorer performance suffers because that 
imagined heading required a transformation which slowed response time and increased 
error in pointing.  
 The JRD task often produces a striking pattern of performance.  When observers 
remember a regular array from a single perspective, certain angles seem privileged in 
their performance (Mou & McNamara, 2002; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 1998; McNamara, 
Rump, & Werner, 2003).  In particular, when participants view the scene from an aligned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Some	  research	  contained	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  also	  published	  in:	  Street,	  W.	  N.,	  &	  Wang,	  R.	  F.	  (2014).	  Differentiating	  spatial	  memory	  from	  spatial	  transformations.	  Journal	  of	  Experimental	  Psychology:	  Learning,	  Memory,	  and	  
Cognition,	  40(2),	  602.	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perspective relative to the primary axis of the array of objects, they show relatively good 
performance for the aligned axis (0˚, 90˚, 180˚, -90˚) while performance from a 
misaligned heading (45˚, 135˚, -135˚, -45˚) results in poorer performance.  This saw-tooth 
pattern of performance is usually taken as evidence that all four aligned perspectives are 
encoded in spatial memory while the misaligned require a transformation for response.  
 This chapter proposes a new logic for understanding these performance 
differences. Good performance for a given reference direction is generally interpreted as 
an encoded representation but what if there is little transformational errors for these 
privileged imagined perspectives? If transformations to aligned perspectives add little or 
no response time and/or error to responses, two or possibly even a single heading may 
exist in memory.   
Spatial transformations can differ in their difficulty and some transformations are 
known to add little cost to responses.  For example, imagined body rotations are 
considerably harder than imagined body translations (Easton & Sholl, 1995; May, 2004; 
Presson & Montello, 1994; Rieser, 1989; Wang, 2003). That is, if you imagine standing 
on a clock at the 6 looking at the 12, if you are asked to imagine standing still but turning 
to face the 3, your response will be more error prone and slower than imagining a move 
to the 3 while still facing the same direction. Additionally, under certain circumstances, 
these mental translations do not affect performance.  When participants maintain their 
heading and mentally shift their location to another position that is equidistant from the 
observer’s actual position, this shift does not hinder performance (Rieser, 1989; Easton & 
Sholl, 1995).  Therefore fast and accurate performance on a task may occur due to an 
encoding advantage or a preferential transformation advantage.  
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 Using performance differences alone to infer a mental representation can over- or 
underspecify exactly what is encoded in memory.  If performance at a novel perspective 
equals performance at the viewed perspective both headings are thought to be represented 
in memory.  However if performance advantages result from easy transformations as well 
as encoding, only one heading may exist in memory with the other benefits from an easy 
transformation.  Furthermore, a viewpoint independent representation may exist where all 
perspectives are encoded and performance advantages do not relate to the underlying 
spatial representation at all.  Therefore another method of assessing spatial encoding is 
needed to better understand how performance relates to spatial representation. 
 Here we develop a novel method based on a competition model inspired by work 
in biases in spatial memory (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Sampaio & Wang, 
2009) and interference that occurs during angular disparity (May, 2004; Presson, 1982; 
Wang, 2003, 2005). This model assumes that if using the encoded representation can 
solve the given task, it will be directly retrieved and used resulting in little or no error.  
However, if this is not possible, the encoded representation will be transformed for the 
task.  The persistent encoded representation, still active after the transformation, may 
attract the transformed response towards the encoded while the transient transformed 
response will not attract subsequent responses. This model can distinguish between 
encoded representations, which will show an attraction pattern and a performance benefit, 
and those that are privileged transformations, which will show a performance advantage 
with no attraction pattern. 
 An example of this attraction analysis, figure 2.1a, depicts two possible test trials.  
Say a participant encoded a given target at -50˚ from the reference object when facing the 
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encoded direction. During test, she is asked to respond from a larger (more positive) 
orientation as depicted in Test 1 where the correct response would be -95˚.  However, if 
these two representations compete, a compromise angle might be chosen, say -70˚.  This 
would result in a positive signed error (bias) of 25˚ ([-70˚] – [-95˚] = 25˚) for Test 1.  
Alternatively, some test trials ask for a response from a smaller (more negative) 
orientation as in Test 2, where a correct response would be -35˚.  Here another 
compromise could be made between these two values, say -45˚. This trial would result in 
a negative signed error of -10˚ ([-45˚] – [-35˚] = -10˚). Therefore responses from larger 
than the encoded orientation should exhibit a positive bias while smaller orientations than 
the encoded should exhibit negative bias.  
This attraction pattern therefore should be centered at the encoded perspective.  
Imagined perspectives near the encoded perspective will show little bias since the 
maximum bias is the disparity between the two response angles (e.g. between -35 and -50 
for example Test 2 in figure 2.1a).  As angles move away from the encoded, if they are 
still biased, this disparity grows so the signed error should increase.  In this way, the 
attraction analysis predicts a positive linear increase in signed error with zero error 
around the encoded perspective. 
In order to do this, we asked participants to encode a perspective outside their 
own viewpoint similar to experiments performed by Mou & McNamara (2002). To 
conclude which orientations were encoded and which showed transformational 
advantages, we used the attraction analysis to test which of four different spatial 
representations exists in memory (figure 2.1b).  First, all four aligned axis may be 
represented in spatial memory, as is traditionally concluded.  Second, the main axis (both 
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0˚ and 180˚), are encoded with the perpendicular axis benefiting from transformational 
ease. Third, a single perspective, 0˚, may be encoded with all other performance benefits 
coming from preferential transformations. Finally, a viewpoint independent 
representation may exist where no attraction pattern exists suggesting all performance 
benefits come from transformational advantages. 
Experiment 1: Small Encoding Shift  
Methods 
 Participants 
 Twenty-five undergraduates from the University of Illinois completed the study 
for course credit. 
 Apparatus 
 Seven unique and easily identifiable objects were used and arranged in a regular 
array.  The array configuration was constructed to match the display used by Mou & 
McNamara (2002).  The long axis of the rectangular mat (1.8 m x 1.1 m), the long axis of 
the testing room (6.7 m x 4.3 m), as well as they symmetry of the object array all aligned.  
Participants were seated approximately 1.5 m away from the center of the mat at a -45˚ 
angle (see figure 2.2a). 
 Procedure 
 All participants completed a study phase followed by a testing phase.  During the 
study phase, participants were led to a viewing chair with their eyes closed.  All 
participants viewed the study array from a single perspective.  Participants were seated -
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45˚ from the primary axis (figure 2.2a) but were instructed to remember the objects from 
an imagined perspective (represented by the red arrow).  An empty chair was placed at 
this instructed 0˚ heading to help understand the imagined heading. The room, mat, and 
array symmetry provided strong cues towards an intrinsic encoding. 
Participants studied the array in 30s intervals with additional 30s study intervals 
given as needed.  To ensure individuals correctly remembered the configuration of 
objects they were quickly tested after study. This was accomplished by having 
individuals point to each object in their own order as if the array was within reach and 
directly in front of them.  They displayed their knowledge by pointing to objects in their 
configuration.  The experimenter assessed visually their knowledge of each object’s 
location in its appropriate configuration. Additionally, individuals needed to align the 
primary axis of the array with their body to indicate that they had followed the instructed 
heading shift. Additional study time was given as needed until these criteria were met. 
After memorizing the array, participants were led back out of the study room with their 
eyes closed and to a computer where they completed the perspective taking task. 
Each participant completed 160 judgments of relative direction trials. Participants 
encountered a screen with three words representing objects in the remembered display 
(figure 2.3).  The center word indicated the object the individual should imagine standing 
at.  The name directly above indicated the facing object.  These two objects therefore set 
up the imagined heading.  Finally a third name orbited the center name with movement of 
the computer mouse. During a trial, participants moved this name to indicate their 
relative pointing response. Both response direction and response time were recorded once 
the mouse was clicked. To create a trial, a reference object (center) was first selected 
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from the seven remembered objects.  Next, the facing object (top) was selected from the 
remaining objects followed by the pointing object (orbiting). This method created sixteen 
different imagined perspective directions.   
Finally, participants drew a map of the remembered array.  Final maps were 
judged based on the configuration of objects represented accurately.  They additionally 
needed to align the long axis of the array with the facing direction of the participant.  
Both of these criteria were used to assess a participant’s memory for the array itself as 
well as their adherence to the instructed reference direction. 
 Data Analysis 
 All participants were first screened for inclusion based on their final map 
performance. All participants met these criteria and were included.   
Participants were evaluated in two ways.  Firstly, the traditional performance 
based analyses were run to replicate the JRD “saw-tooth” aligned direction advantage for 
RT and absolute angular error.  
Secondly, signed error (response angle minus correct angle) was assessed at each 
of four imagined headings, 0, 90, -90, and 180.  In order to see these attraction patterns, 
four linear regression analyses were run, one for each possible encoded aligned axis, 0˚, 
90˚, -90˚, and 180˚.  Each analysis was based on one of the aligned perspectives and 
included ±45˚.  Testing 180˚ occurred from 135˚ through 225˚ by recoding -135˚ 
through -180˚.   
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Results 
 Trials with absolute error above 90˚ were excluded as mistakes (462 trials - 12% 
of all trials). Absolute angular error and response time followed the saw-tooth pattern as 
found in previous studies (Mou & McNamara, 2002; see figure 2.4).  Response time was 
lower for aligned (M = 11s, SE = .61) than misaligned (M = 13.3s, SE = .88) perspectives 
(paired t(24) = 4.4, p < .001) and the same pattern held true for absolute angular error 
(aligned M = 15.7˚, SE = 2.5; misaligned M = 26.4˚, SE = 2.2) (paired t(24) = 7.2, p 
< .001). From these results then, it appears there are four preferred headings in memory.  
 The attraction analysis found only one significant correlation centered at 0˚ (r 
= .55, p < .001) but not around any other axis that showed a performance advantage (90˚, 
-90˚, 180˚) (rs < .11, ps > .27).  Therefore while four angles show a performance 
advantage, only the instructed perspective attracts nearby responses.  This finding 
suggests that only a single heading is encoded in memory with transformational 
advantages for the other three aligned axes.   
Conclusion 
 This experiment replicated Mou & McNamara’s (2002) response time and 
absolute angular error saw-tooth pattern for an imagined encoded perspective.  This saw-
tooth pattern suggests that four different axes were encoded in spatial memory however, 
our attraction analysis found evidence for only one attraction pattern.  This systematic 
attraction suggests only the instructed imagined perspective (0˚) during encoding was 
stored in memory.  All other aligned axes showed performance benefits due to a 
transformational advantage. 
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Experiment 2: Large Encoding Shift 
  As a further test of this finding we asked participants to imagine a larger 
perspective shift during the memory portion of the task.  This larger shift should be more 
difficult to encode but once remembered correctly, signed angular errors should show the 
same attraction pattern as in experiment 1.  If however, this more difficult encoding 
changes the spatial representation of the array, the attraction analysis may center around 
different or multiple headings.  
Methods 
 Participants 
 Twenty-four new University of Illinois undergraduates completed the study for 
course credit.  Two additional participants were excluded from the analysis due to 
incorrect post-test maps.  
 Apparatus 
 The study array was exactly the same as in experiment 1 however the individual’s 
seating position was positioned 135˚ from the 0˚ ‘front’ of the array (figure 2.2b).  
 Procedure 
 Participants followed exactly the same procedure as in experiment 1 although 
they were asked to imagine themselves at the 135˚ counter-clockwise position.  Before 
moving on to the computer task, participants needed to correctly indicate the position of 
the objects from the imagined perspective as if they aligned their body with the instructed 
0˚ imagined heading. 
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 Data Analysis 
 Data was analyzed using the same procedure as in experiment 1. 
Results 
 Responses were faster for aligned (M = 11.5s, SE = .65) (figure 2.5) than for 
misaligned judgments (M = 13s, SE = .74) (paired t(23) = 2.95, p = .007).  Similarly, 
absolute angular error was higher for aligned (M = 16.1˚, SE = 2.3) than for misaligned 
judgments (M = 28.3˚, SE = 2.1) (paired t(23) = 9.3 , p < .001).  Even this more extreme 
imagined heading produced the typical “saw-toothed” pattern of performance with 
aligned judgments performing better than misaligned. 
 Additionally, the signed error analysis found a significant correlation only for the 
instructed 0˚ heading (r = .33, p = .004) but not around any other axis that showed a 
performance advantage (90˚, -90˚, 180˚) (rs < .19, ps > .11) suggesting only the 
instructed heading was encoded in memory. 
Conclusion 
 Participants were able to correctly remember the extreme 135˚ imagined 
perspective shift during encoding.  Just as before, the performance data suggests all four 
aligned axis are represented in spatial memory however, the attraction analysis finds that 
only a single perspective is remembered which suggests that the other three are a result of 
transformational advantages. 
Discussion 
Perspective taking performance is often used to uncover a spatial representation’s 
structure.  Better performance is generally taken as a sign that a perspective is encoded 
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with poorer performance a signal of mental transformations.  Here we present a novel 
attraction analysis that suggests performance cannot always identify representation.  
Specifically, better performance can arise when stored information is directly retrieved 
from memory, if transformations are fast and accurate, or both.  A new attraction analysis 
method was used to discriminate between these two potential interpretations for both a 
small and large imagined perspective shift.  Regardless of the shift size, participants 
encoded only a single perspective even though both speed and accuracy suggested four 
aligned perspectives were encoded. This new measure is also more sensitive than the 
original performance-based measure because it is able to distinguish between an 
encoding versus a transformational advantage. Overall these results suggest caution is 
necessary when inferring representations from performance data alone.   
Both of these experiments resulted in a single stored reference direction in 
memory.  However, there may be cases where multiple perspectives are stored due to 
instructions, non-overlapping external reference frames (such as the room, mat, and 
object’s intrinsic axes), or experience with different viewpoints.  Changes in these 
conditions may lead to further understanding about when and under what conditions 
perspectives are chosen and used in spatial memory.  
Exactly why the attraction patterns look the way they do is unclear.  The 
attraction appears strongest around 45 degrees from the represented heading.  One factor 
driving this effect is that the amount of pull cannot exceed the disparity between the 
encoded and transformed representation.  Additionally, it is possible that after about 45 
degrees the attraction itself looses its pull on the final response.  Why the attraction effect 
falls off at this point requires further study.   
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Additionally, exactly where the competition among representations occurs is 
unclear.  The attraction could occur when the transformed representation is calculated, 
during response selection when both representations are active, or in both places.  Further 
research is needed to study the time course of this interference. 
Finally, the mechanism of the competition between the two reference frames is 
unclear from this data alone.  It is possible that a weighted average of the two responses 
is used.  If so, these responses should form a distribution with a single peak.  
Alternatively, this data could derive from some responses coming directly from the 
encoded representation and others from the transformed representation.  Together these 
two would average to represent the attraction pattern seen here.  Further work on the 
distribution analysis in chapter 3 can shed some light on this mechanism question. 
Representational form is not always apparent from performance data.  With this 
attraction analysis, responses from an encoded representation can be separated from those 
that exhibit transformation advantages.  This new tool, therefore, gives a clearer view of 
how spatial memories are formed and used while challenge the traditional analysis and 
interpretation of perspective taking paradigms. 
 
 	    
	  34	  
Figures 
 
 
   
Figure 2.1 
(a) Attraction analysis calculation and (b) predicted attraction pattern if 
all axes are encoded, one axes encoded, a single perspective encoded, or a 
view independent encoding from top to bottom. 
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Figure 2.2 
Study viewpoint for both the (a) -45˚ and (b) 135˚ shift condition. 
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Figure 2.3  
Response screen.  For this trial, the participant is asked to imagine standing 
at the pot while facing the brush and ‘point’ to the basket. 
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a      b 
 
                c 
 
 
Figure 2.4 
 
Response time (a), absolute angular error (b) and signed angular error (c) analysis for 
the -45˚ shift encoding with standard error bars. 
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a      b 
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Figure 2.5 
 
Response time (a), absolute error (b) and signed error (c) analysis for the 135˚ shift 
encoding.  Error bars represent standard error. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXAMINING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
REFERENCE FRAMES USING A BIAS DISTRIBUTION 
ANALYSIS2 
Spatial locations are inherently relative.  That is, a location only exists in relation 
to a reference frame which consists of a reference point and direction.  A reference point 
specifies an origin while a reference direction denotes the conceptual north of a reference 
frame. With this representation, any location can be specified as a distance from the 
reference point and an angle off of the reference direction. Reference direction selection 
has generally been the focus of spatial memory research (Easton & Sholl, 1995; Klatzky, 
Loomis, Beall, Chance, & Golledge, 1998; McNamara, Rump, & Werner, 2003; Mou & 
McNamara, 2002; Presson & Montello, 1994; Rieser, 1989; Wang, 2005, 2012; Wang & 
Spelke, 2000, 2002).  Reference directions are usually divided into two main categories, 
egocentric and allocentric.  An egocentric reference direction is one based on the viewer 
while allocentric reference directions is based on any external direction. 
 One of the most commonly used tasks to test reference direction in spatial 
memory is the judgment of relative direction (JRD) task.  Here, participants memorize a 
scene of objects from a particular perspective.  They are then asked to take an imagined 
heading, such as “Imagine standing at A facing B”, and respond to a target, “point to C.” 
Changing imagined heading require shifts in body heading, a mental rotation which 
produces poorer performance as the angle of rotation increases (Reiser, 1989; Easton & 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  work	  also	  appears	  in	  Street,	  W.	  N.,	  &	  Wang,	  R.	  F.	  (2015).	  Examining	  reference	  frame	  interaction	  in	  spatial	  memory	  using	  a	  distribution	  analysis.	  Psychonomic	  bulletin	  &	  review,	  1-­‐7.	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Sholl, 1995). JRD task performance generally assume that imagined headings parallel to 
an encoded reference direction will have lower error and faster response times since they 
can be retrieved directly from memory. Imagined perspectives that are not encoded in 
memory however, must be mentally transformed which increases absolute angular error 
and response time.  Therefore, by testing a variety of different imagined perspectives, 
JRD performance is taken as distinguishing between encoded and transformed headings.  
Previous studies on perspective taking have suggested an egocentric reference 
direction is encoded as the default reference direction in the absence of other cues or 
influences in the environment (Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Shelton & McNamara, 
2001). Shelton & McNamara (2001) showed participants an array of objects from one 
perspective, and then asked them to make imagined heading shifts during test.  When a 
heading shift aligned with the experienced view, pointing performance was better than at 
other imagined headings.  This performance advantage was interpreted as a single 
reference direction encoded in spatial memory from the egocentric viewpoint.  
However, an egocentric reference direction does not always seem to be encoded 
in memory.  Mou & McNamara (2002) instructed participants to remember an array from 
an imagined allocentric perspective.  When tested, their performance was best for 
imagined headings that aligned with those of the instructed perspective.  Furthermore, no 
performance advantage existed for the experienced, egocentric perspective suggesting 
this viewpoint was not encoded in memory. This evidence was taken as support that the 
array’s intrinsic properties drive reference direction selection with no influence from an 
egocentric perspective. 
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 Additionally, reference frames do not always exist in isolation and are known to 
interact within spatial language and attention.  When judging if one object is above 
another, multiple reference directions are active (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993) and 
these interfere if a primed and response reference direction mismatch (Carlson-
Radvansky & Jiang, 1998). Similarly, egocentric and intrinsic reference directions may 
compete producing a biased response.  If an egocentric reference direction is obligatorily 
encoded in spatial memory, taking an allocentric reference directions may be possible but 
with an influence of the egocentric perspective. To test this possibility, we developed a 
new distribution analysis that looks at bias instead of performance to see an effect of 
competing reference directions. 
This new paradigm uses a modified JRD task.  While typical JRD performance is 
interpreted by the retrieval-or-transform logic, performance on a given imagined heading 
may be better because it is encoded in memory, because certain transformations are easier 
than others, or because a transformed representation differs enough from the encoded 
representation such that they do not interfere with one another (chapter 2). Therefore, 
response time and absolute angular error can highlight differences between imagined 
headings but will not show any systematic shifts in pointing bias.  Signed error, on the 
other hand, can show systematic bias in pointing responses such as those between an 
encoded and transformed representation. This bias can occur in two ways.  Firstly, 
individuals may fail to represent the instructed heading and instead fall back on the 
stronger encoded perspective.  Secondly, signed errors for those individuals who do take 
the instructed heading may be biased towards the competing perspective. Importantly, 
signed errors still cannot tell where this competition occurs as it may occur during 
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encoding of a spatial memory, response calculation, or response selection.  This 
procedure can suggest which reference directions compete and bias other responses 
thereby highlighting which reference directions are encoded in spatial memory.      
We used a modified judgment of relative direction task to classify individuals as 
taking an intrinsic, an egocentric, or an alternative reference direction and compared the 
number of individuals who accurately took the instructed heading across an egocentric 
instruction and an intrinsic instruction condition similar to Mou & McNamara (2002). If 
competition for a particular heading is low, more individuals’ signed angular errors 
should cluster around the instructed perspective.  Higher competition may work in two 
ways.  If an egocentric reference direction is more influential, allocentric headings should 
be biased towards the egocentric perspective.  This bias can take the form of more 
individuals representing the egocentric heading and/or allocentric imagined headings 
showing systematic bias towards the egocentric perspective.  If on the other hand an 
intrinsic reference direction strongly influences a pointing response, more individuals 
should respond with an intrinsic direction when instructed to remember the array 
egocentrically and those who do remember the scene egocentrically should be biased 
towards the intrinsic direction.  
Experiment 3: Random Array 
Methods 
Participants 
 Fifty University of Illinois undergraduates completed the task for course credit.  
These included 21 males and 29 females. 
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Stimuli 
Participants viewed the task on a desktop 17-inch display.  For each trial, they 
viewed a virtual scene of four colored pegs (red, blue, yellow, and white) on a light gray 
floor surrounded by a cyan background.  These pegs were placed at random locations on 
the rectangular floor for each trial. All participants viewed the array from a 45˚ offset of 
the intrinsic array of the floor and 30˚ above the floor plane.  During study, participants 
could move their perspective 5˚ by moving the mouse right and left (clockwise or counter 
clockwise shift) or up and down (vertical shift). This slight variation in viewing angle 
allowed participants a greater view of the depth of the scene and allowed better viewing 
of any overlapping pegs.   
During test, participants viewed a display with two dots.  A central dot (the red 
dot in figure 3.1c) told participants where to imagine standing while a rotating outer dot 
(yellow) allowed a pointing response by moving the mouse.  The color of the dots 
corresponded to the remembered peg identities. For all test trials, imagined heading was 
held constant depending on the participant’s instruction condition. 
Design 
All participants viewed this scene from an oblique 45˚ angle from the primary 
axis of the floor.  Twenty-five participants were instructed to remember the scene from 
their current viewpoint, the Self condition (figure 3.1a, blue).  The other twenty-five were 
instructed to remember the display as if they were viewing the array from an imagined 
intrinsic reference direction, the Floor-axis condition (figure 3.1a, red).  During response, 
the top of the response screen (front on figure 3.1c) always corresponded to the 
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appropriate front during study (figure 3.1a blue for self and red for floor-axis).  In this 
way, the response screen acted like a map for a pointing response. 
Procedure 
 Each trial consisted of a study display, a brief retention period and a test display. 
A trial consisted of a seven second study display, a 500 ms retention blank screen 
followed by a test display which continued until a subject responded.  This test display 
consisted of a single judgment of relative direction pointing response of two randomly 
selected pegs.  After responding, the next trial began.  Every twenty trials participants 
could take a self-paced break before beginning another trial block.  Subjects completed 
nine blocks of twenty trials for a total of 180 trials or less if they took longer than 45 
minutes to complete the test.    
Data Analysis 
 For each trial signed error was calculated by subtracting the correct angle from 
the response angle.  Negative error means participants responded in a counterclockwise 
direction while positive error means they responded farther clockwise than the correct 
answer.  If participants were accurately representing the instructed reference direction, 
signed errors across all the trials should be centered around the instructed heading with 
about equal negative and positive error.  Any deviation from the instructed perspective 
would create a biased distribution.  That is if an egocentric perspective interacted with the 
intrinsic perspective, these responses should show a negative bias.  If however the floor-
axis reference direction interferes with egocentric perspective taking they should show a 
positive bias.  With this analysis, it is possible to see how reference directions interfere in 
spatial memory. 
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 However, individual differences may offer an alternative explanation.  Individuals 
may differ in their spatial learning and perspective taking abilities (Hegarty & Waller, 
2004; Wolbers & Hegarty, 2010). Some individuals may be unable or unwilling to take 
the instructed reference direction.  These individuals might inadvertently bias the group 
data but not for the reason mentioned above.  Therefore, we preformed an individual 
analysis to identify these individuals from the bias analysis. 
 For each subject, signed error was plotted as a histogram with a kernel curve fit to 
the data.  Kernel curves provide a smooth curve based on the data while making no 
normality assumptions. Each of these curves was categorized based on the peak of the 
distribution. To make this classification, categories were defined in 45˚ segments (figure 
3.2.  Almost all individuals were classified as egocentric for those distributed around the 
experienced viewpoint or intrinsic for those centered around the heading parallel to the 
long axis of the virtual floor.  A very few individuals were classified as taking the 
secondary intrinsic for those parallel to the short axis of the virtual floor or other 
perspectives.  For both the intrinsic and egocentric instruction condition, 0˚ corresponds 
to the instructed heading so the egocentric instruction group categories were defined as 
egocentric from -22.5˚ to 22.5˚, intrinsic from 22.5˚ to 67.5˚, and secondary intrinsic 
from -22.5˚ to -67.5˚.  The intrinsic instruction condition was categorized either as 
intrinsic from -22.5˚ to 22.5˚, egocentric from -22.5˚ to -67.5˚, or secondary intrinsic 
from -67.5˚ to -112.5˚. Two independent raters selected which category the peak of the 
kernel curve fit into.   
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To assess if the number of individuals unable to take the instructed perspective 
was significant, a test of equal proportion was run comparing the proportion of 
participants who were classified as correctly following the instructions across condition.   
Finally, all participants categorized as taking the incorrect perspective for each 
condition were removed.  All other participants were included in an overall bias analysis 
where mean signed error for each subject was tested with a one-sample t-test to see if any 
systematic bias existed. 
Results 
Not all participants completed all 180 trials due to time constraints.  Individuals 
ranged from 124 to 180 trials with a mean of 176 for the Floor-axis condition and 175 for 
the Self condition.  However, since each trial was randomly created, all trials completed 
by participants were used.  Trials with over 90˚ absolute error were removed from further 
analysis as incorrect trials.  This removed 13% of the Floor-axis trials and 10% of Self 
trials. 
When participants were asked to imagine an intrinsic reference direction, 
seventeen participants (68%) were classified as representing the instructed intrinsic 
heading while seven (17%) represented the egocentric heading and one (4%) was 
categorized as taking the secondary intrinsic heading (see figure 3.3a).  When participants 
were asked to take an egocentric reference direction, twenty-three (92%) participants 
were categorized as taking the instructed egocentric heading while one (4%) responded 
with an intrinsic heading and one (4%) represented the secondary intrinsic heading (see 
figure 3.3b).  The difference in the proportion of individuals who correctly complied with 
the instructions was significant (z = -2.2, p = .03) where the intrinsic reference direction 
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was followed significantly less often than the egocentric reference direction.  Both raters 
independently rated each distribution and agreed on all individual’s classifications. 
Retaining only those classified as correctly following instructions for their condition, a 
one sample t-tests revealed that the intrinsic instruction condition contained a significant 
bias (mean = -8.9˚; t(16) = -10.5, p < .001) while the egocentric instructions did not 
(mean = =-0.4˚; t(22) = 0.34, p = .73) (see figure 3.4 a and b). 3 
Conclusions 
 The Self instruction condition was followed significantly more often than Floor-
axis instructions.  Furthermore, if participants failed to follow the Floor-axis instructions, 
most took an egocentric reference direction.  When those participants who did not or 
could not follow the correct instructions were removed, the remaining pointing responses 
were pulled towards the egocentric reference direction.  No bias occurred in the 
egocentric instructions condition.  Both the bias and significant difference in instruction 
following supports the theory that the Self reference direction automatically exerts an 
influence over the Floor-axis instructed perspective while the Floor-axis perspective does 
not interfere with the Self perspective taking. 
 However, this bias and lack of instruction adherence may stem from the stimuli 
themselves.  The intrinsic axis of configuration of the pegs was not strong because the 
objects themselves were placed randomly on the floor.  Therefore even though the floor 
and instructions provide a cue for the intrinsic reference direction, the array itself might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Alternatively,	  the	  peak	  value	  of	  the	  kernel	  distribution	  could	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  bias.	  These peak values were found for each individual mathematically and submitted to a 
one-sample t-test.  Here, the intrinsic instruction condition showed a significant shift 
towards the egocentric (mean = -8.06; t(16) = 7.8, p < .0001 ) while the egocentric 
condition showed no such shift (mean = .08; t (22)= .06, p = .95). 	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require strong regularity in order for people to represent an unbiased intrinsic reference 
direction.  Experiment 4 tests this possibility by creating regular, symmetrical displays to 
see if intrinsic instruction following increased and the bias disappeared. 
Experiment 4: Symmetrical Array 
Methods 
 Participants 
 Fifty different (25 male, 25 female) University of Illinois undergraduate students 
completed the computer task for course credit. 
 Procedure 
 The procedure was identical as experiment 3 except for the placement of the pegs 
on the floor and which objects were possible during test.  Two peg locations were 
selected at some distance from the center of the floor out to the floor’s edges.  These two 
positions were then mirrored across the primary axis of the floor (figure 3.1b).  This 
selection produced displays that were symmetrical along the primary axis but not along 
the secondary axis which produced an isosceles trapezoid which may simplify the 
memory task and make the intrinsic axis of the array itself more salient.  Finally, this 
symmetry led to some pairs of objects to be superficially easy and therefore the two 
objects mirrored along the primary axis were excluded as possible test pairs.  
 Data Analysis 
 Individual histograms were classified exactly as in experiment 3 and the same 
bias analysis was completed. 
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Results 
 Individuals completed between 155 and 180 trials with a mean of 176 trials in the 
Floor-axis condition and 180 trials for the Self condition.  Trials with over 90˚ absolute 
error were again removed as incorrect responses.  This accounted for 12% of Floor-axis 
and 7% of Self condition.   
Individual graphs can be found in figure 3.5a for the intrinsic instruction 
condition and 3.5b for the egocentric instruction condition. When instructed to take the 
intrinsic reference direction, sixteen (64%) responded with the correct intrinsic heading, 
seven (28%) responded with an egocentric heading, and two (8%) responded with a 
secondary intrinsic heading.   In the egocentric instruction condition, twenty-one (84%) 
of participants represented the instructed egocentric heading while one (4%) took the 
intrinsic heading and three (12%) took a secondary intrinsic heading.  The test for equal 
proportions of individuals who took the correctly instructed reference direction across 
condition was marginally significant (z = -1.6, p = .1).  Both raters independently rated 
each individual’s distribution and fully agreed on each categorization. 
 Keeping only participants who correctly responded with the instructed perspective, 
the Floor-axis instruction condition still showed significant bias towards the Self heading 
(mean = -4.9˚; t(15) = -6.0, p < .001) while the Self instruction condition showed no such 
bias (mean = .2˚; t(20) = .28, p = .78) (see figure 3.4 C and D)4.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A one-sample t-test on the kernel curve peaks again found a significant bias in the 
Floor-axis condition (mean = -2.5; t(15) = -5.2, p = .0001) while no significant difference 
was found in the Self condition (mean = 1.62; t(20) = 1.77, p = .09).  	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Conclusions 
 Accuracy in adhering to the instructions marginally differed in the two conditions 
when array symmetry was increased. However, the Floor-axis instruction group still 
showed significant bias towards the Self perspective. The Self instruction condition again 
showed no bias. Therefore, even with the more salient intrinsic reference frame provided 
by the array symmetry, the egocentric perspective biased responses in the intrinsic 
instruction condition. 
 
Experiment 5: Bias in Real World Displays  
 From the previous two studies, there is evidence that bias is occurring in spatial 
memory towards the self.  However, up until this point, this bias has only occurred in a 
simulated computer environment.  The real world contains additional complexity not 
easily simulated.  In particular, Mou & McNamara (2002) use a regular array aligned 
with a rectangular rug and room.  With these overlapping reference frames, it may be 
possible that the intrinsic reference direction is strong enough to allow individuals to 
encode an allocentric representation with no bias towards the self.  In this experiment, we 
used the Mou & McNamara (2002) array (see figure 3.6a) to see if bias occurs even in the 
strongest intrinsic real world scenario.   
Methods 
 Participants 
 25 undergraduate students (9 male, 16 female) from the University of Illinois 
completed the study for course credit. 
 Procedure 
	  51	  
 Here, participants learned a real world array (figure 3.6a).  After memorizing the 
object locations, they completed the modified JRD task where perspective direction was 
held constant to assess for bias.   
Participants were first brought into the display room with their eyes closed.  They 
were seated at a perspective -45º from the primary intrinsic axis of the room/rug/array to 
mirror the Floor-axis conditions of experiment 3 and 4 but with a real world display. 
They were then asked to remember all seven object locations as if they were at the Floor-
axis direction (represented in figure 3.6a as the red arrow). 
Participants were given as much time as they needed to remember all objects in 
the array.  When ready, they closed their eyes.  To test their knowledge, participants 
pointed in a small imaginary space in front of them to each object as if they could reach 
the objects and as if they were standing in the imagined location.  If the participants made 
any mistakes more study time was given until accurate performance was possible.  The 
experimenter judged accurate performance.  Participants needed to demonstrate they 
knew the object locations the Floor-axis instructed direction and maintain the correct 
configuration of all seven objects. 
After encoding the scene, participants were led from the room again with their 
eyes closed and taken to the computer task.  Participants completed JRDs just as in the 
previous experiments however instead of using colors to denote different locations, object 
names were used (see figure 3.6b).  All participants were instructed to remember the 
array from the intrinsic array axis direction (0º) while seated -45º from that position (see 
figure 3.6a) mirroring the Floor-axis instruction condition. 
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 Data Analysis 
 The data analysis was performed as in the previous studies by first assessing 
instruction taking accuracy and then looking for bias in the errors of those correctly 
following instructions. Trials with error over 90˚ were removed as incorrect responses.  
It is worth noting here that there are some differences between this and the 
previous studies.  Unlike the random and symmetric studies, participants now relied on 
longer term knowledge of the array for the entire experiment rather than the relatively 
brief trial-by-trial memory used before.  Additionally, there were far fewer unique trials 
due to the limited number of object locations remembered. JRD tasks usually vary the 
reference direction probed during test however the distribution analysis requires a large 
number of trials at the same reference direction.  Therefore, reference direction was held 
constant and a single object was displayed to denote standing location with a pointing 
object circling it.  This meant there were 42 unique trials which were randomly selected 
from for 160 trials.  These constraints led to a fair amount of repetition throughout the 
testing task.  Additionally answers were often 0º, 90º, -90º, and 180º due to the regular 
nature of the array.  Either of these two changes might reduce or eliminate any bias 
observed for uninteresting reasons. 
Results 
 22 out of 25 (88%) participants correctly took the instructed reference direction as 
judged by raters (see figure 3.7).  Of those judged as incorrect, one responded with the 
secondary intrinsic axis while the other two respond with the 180º rotation of the 
instructed reference direction. These three individuals were removed from further 
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analysis. Generally participants did well in this task as compared with the previous 
intrinsic instruction conditions (68% for experiment 3 and 64% for experiment 4).    
 A one-sample t-test was run to assess bias in average subject response.  The test 
showed a significant bias in response towards the self perspective5 (mean = -1.0˚; t(21) = 
2.9, p < .001).  
Conclusion 
 When participants were asked to complete a real world version of the Floor-axis 
perspective taking task, responses showed a small but significant bias towards the self 
which replicates the computer tasks. Participants were overall excellent at this task most 
likely due to the repetition and consistency of the target trials.  Furthermore, many of the 
trials given to participants resulted in 0º, 90º, -90º, and 180º responses further simplifying 
the memory component of the task.  These factors likely underestimated a true effect of 
bias because they make the task more easy and regular. 
Discussion 
 When encoding a scene, a reference direction is needed to act as a relative ‘north’. 
Here we used a novel distribution and bias analysis to classify responses after a judgment 
of relative direction task.  This method relies on interaction between multiple reference 
frames in spatial memory.  If two reference frames compete, the more influential should 
bias any less influential representations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  peak	  analysis	  was	  also	  completed	  on	  these	  data.	  	  Here,	  no	  significant	  bias	  was	  found	  towards	  the	  self	  (mean	  =	  -­‐0.24;	  t(21)	  =	  1.63;	  p	  =	  .118).	  The	  major	  benefit	  of	  the	  peak	  analysis	  is	  that	  it	  isn’t	  skewed	  by	  the	  tails	  of	  the	  distribution	  like	  a	  mean.	  	  In	  this	  case	  however	  participants	  are	  fairly	  accurate	  to	  begin	  with	  so	  removing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  tails	  takes	  away	  the	  effect	  and	  may	  not	  accurately	  describe	  the	  data.	  The	  significant	  result	  from	  the	  mean	  analysis	  but	  not	  the	  peak	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  bias	  is	  found	  in	  those	  tails.	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Using a judgment of relative direction task, participants remembered the locations 
of objects from either their own egocentric perspective or an imagined intrinsic viewpoint.  
When object locations were randomly distributed, more individuals responded accurately 
in the egocentric instruction condition compared to the intrinsic instruction condition.  
Furthermore, those participants whose responses did peak correctly around the instructed 
intrinsic heading showed systematic bias towards the egocentric perspective.  This 
systematic bias occurred even when the displays contained a stronger intrinsic reference 
frame through symmetry and when tested in the real world.  This pattern of performance 
suggests that the self perspective exerts an automatic influence over an intrinsic 
representation.  This occurs even in cases where overlapping allocentric reference frames 
strengthen the intrinsic representation.  
Where this bias occurs is unclear.  Individuals may encode only an egocentric 
reference direction in memory and transform to an instructed allocentric reference 
direction as needed.  In this case, the bias may occur during transformation for a response.  
Alternatively, the instructions to remember the array from an intrinsic reference direction 
may have resulted in an intrinsic reference direction alone in memory which would mean 
the egocentric bias occurs during encoding. Further research is needed to test these 
possibilities. 	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Figures 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
The modified JRD task for both (a) the random peg locations from experiment 3, and (b) 
the symmetrical peg positions from experiment 4.  Individuals in the Self instruction 
condition were instructed to remember the pegs along the blue arrow while the Floor-
axis study group took the imagined heading indicated by the red arrow.  Participants 
could shift their perspective a small amount during study.  (a) and (b) show the extent of 
this shift.  (c) Judgments of relative direction were made by consistently holding the 
‘front’ constant while asking participants to imagine standing at the center peg (red) and 
point to the rotating dot (yellow).  
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Figure 3.2 
Categorization ranges for reference direction encoding. 
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A	  
Figure	  3.3 
Individual participant’s signed error histograms and kernel curve fits for experiment 3 
intrinsic instructions (a) and egocentric instructions (b) with categorization cut-off 
boundaries. Those outlined in red were judged by both independent raters as not 
following the specified instructions for their condition and were removed from further 
analysis. 
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Figure	  3.3	  (cont.) 
B	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A      B 
 
C      D 
 
Figure 3.4 
Histogram and kernel curves for all participants excluding those who did not take the 
instructed reference direction for experiment 3 (random array) with (a) Self and (b) 
Floor-axis instructions as well as experiment 4 (symmetrical array) with (c) Self and (d) 
Floor-axis instruction conditions. A rightward shift in A and C would mean the 
egocentric shifting towards the array’s intrinsic perspective. For B and D, a leftward 
shift indicates an intrinsic perspective shifting towards the egocentric viewpoint.   
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A	  
Figure 3.5 
Individual participant’s signed error histograms and kernel curve fits for experiment 4 
(a) Floor-axis instructions and (b) Self instructions with categorization cut-off 
boundaries. Red boarders indicate individual’s judged as not following the 
instructions for their given condition by the raters.	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Figure 3.5 (cont.) 
B	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a.  
b.  
Figure 3.6 
(a)Participants viewed the array from an off centered perspective but were 
asked to remember the scene as if they were facing the Floor-axis direction 
indicated by the red arrow. (b) When responding, participants were instructed 
to use their imagined perspective throughout the test.  They then were asked to 
judge the relative direction of one object relative to the other.  In this case they 
are asked to ‘point’ to the brush as if they were standing at the vase. 
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Figure 3.7 
Individual participant’s signed error histograms and kernel curve fits for 
experiment 5 with those judged not following to instructions boxed in red. 
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CHAPTER 4: REFERENCE POINTS IN SPATIAL 
MEMORY  
Locations are inherently relative and require a reference frame in memory.  A cup 
on a table may be one meter from you, at the center of the table, or .25 meters from the 
plate. In each of these instances a different origin, also called a reference point, is used to 
define the location of the cup. A reference point can be the observer, often called an 
egocentric reference point, or one outside the self, an allocentric reference point. To fully 
specify a reference frame, a conceptual ‘north’ or a reference direction, is also needed. 
Most research on reference frames focuses on which of these reference directions are 
used in spatial memory and under what circumstances.  However, to fully understand 
how reference frames operate in memory, reference point selection requires further study.   
  Often reference frames in spatial memory are tested with the judgment of relative 
direction (JRD) task.  Individual are asked remember a scene from a single perspective, 
imagine different headings, and then point to remembered objects. Lower response times 
and absolute pointing errors suggest an imagined heading is encoded in spatial memory 
however if performance is worse, a mental transformation is inferred.   
The JRD task tests reference frames by imagined heading shifts that are changes 
in reference direction. Furthermore, shifts in reference direction are spatial rotations that 
elicit a cost as the imagined rotation increases (Easton & Sholl, 1995; Presson & 
Montello, 1994; Rieser, 1989). However, shifts of reference point are spatial translations, 
shifts forward, back, and side-to-side while facing the same direction.  Spatial 
translations produce little to no performance costs when people imagine shifts to 
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equidistant locations around regular shape such as a circle or square (Rieser, 1989; 
Easton & Sholl, 1995).  However, some translations do elicit a performance cost such as 
non-regular distance shifts (Easton & Sholl, 1995; May, 2004; Wang, 2005). Because 
JRD tasks often do not have equidistant object shifts, reference point could be studied 
with this task however typically object locations are close together meaning any 
translation cost would be minimal.   
Generally the difference in difficulty between a mental rotation and mental 
translation is taken as evidence that mental rotations require individuals to mentally ‘turn’ 
their body to an instructed direction which are thought to be more costly to performance 
than mentally ‘moving’ while maintaining a heading. This transformational hypothesis 
comes from the object mental rotation literature where the amount of rotation drives the 
time a mental rotation takes (Cooper & Shepard, 1973). May (2004) however, used a 
different methodology to test weather these differences in performance were due to 
differences in transformations or if they were from an interaction during response 
selection.  That is, the pointing response from the individual’s actual position may 
interfere with the imagined pointing angle required for the task.  May theorized that if 
this interaction occurs, pointing performance should increase as the disparity between the 
imagined and real pointing direction increased (figure 4.1).  
In a series of carefully controlled studies, individuals stood in the center of an 
array of objects and were asked to remember a set of objects and locations. They were 
then asked to take imagined translations, ‘imagine standing at location A’, or rotations, 
‘imagine looking at location A’, and were then instructed to point to a remembered object. 
When they did, pointing errors and response times varied as a function of object disparity 
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regardless of whether the instructed transformation was a rotation or translation.  This 
object disparity effect supports the interaction account where individuals’ poorer 
performance comes not from difficulty imagining rotations but where physical pointing 
angle interacts with the transformed pointing angle. 
 May’s (2004) original experiment pitted an individual’s physical position with 
that of a mentally transformed representation.  He found that performance costs came not 
from the difficulty of the transformation but because these two representations conflicted 
when individuals stood in the center of the remembered array during test.  The following 
study extends this hypothesis and studies if this interference among different translations 
may also operate between a remembered reference frame and a response location. 
 While a typical JRD task is not ideal to test reference point selection, this chapter 
uses the disparity interaction paradigm with a modified JRD task to assess reference point 
encoding.  Reference points and directions are theoretically separable (chapter 1) so it is 
possible people encode the scene relative to some external reference direction with an 
egocentric reference point or vice versa.  To test this hypothesis we held reference 
direction constant throughout the following task so that any performance cost or 
advantage must be due to shifts of reference point alone. We then tested if object 
disparity from two possible reference point encodings explained pointing performance. 
When the encoded pointing response is similar to the imagined pointing response, little or 
no interaction should occur (such as figure 4.1b).  However as the disparity increases, the 
interaction between the two angles should also increase (figure 4.1a).    If interference 
occurs, response time and/or absolute pointing error should correlate with the disparity 
between the remembered and transformed pointing angle.  
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 This procedure for identifying the reference point of a spatial reference frame 
makes specific predictions depending on which reference point is encoded in spatial 
memory.  Potential reference points fall into three categories.  First, a reference point can 
be egocentric, one that encodes all objects relative to the viewer’s position in space. 
Secondly, allocentric reference points are possible where all object locations are 
remembered relative to a landmark or position outside the viewer.  This disparity 
interaction procedure can test any position, allo- or egocentric, as a possible reference 
point in memory.  
The self reference point, positioned at the viewer’s virtual location in the scene, 
was tested using the disparity procedure along with an environment reference point.  
Because the virtual display was sparse in landmarks, the most likely other reference point 
was a location on the virtual floor.  We chose to test the center of the floor as an 
additional possible reference point.  While many other spatial locations are possible and 
testable, these two locations are the most likely options in this virtual environment.  
Some researchers have suggested reference points are substantially different than 
those discussed above and that locations are stored as object-to-object relationships 
(Rieser, 1989; Easton & Sholl, 1995; McNamara, 2003; Mou & McNamara, 2002) Here, 
one object is remembered in relation to all other objects.  A pure object-to-object 
relational encoding would posit a null effect for these experiments since object locations 
would be retrieved directly from memory with no translation shift and therefore no 
correlation with disparity. While this task cannot directly test object-to-object encoding, 
effects of disparity on performance would suggest some specific reference point is being 
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used in spatial memory even if object locations are also redundantly remembered in 
object-to-object relationships. 
Experiment 6 
Methods 
 Participants 
  Twenty-five University of Illinois undergraduate students completed the 
experiment for course credit.   
 Materials 
 Displays, sized approximately 30 degrees of visual angle, consisted of a computer 
generated rectangular floor with four pegs. All pegs were the same height, located 
randomly, and differed in color. These colors were used to identify pegs during the test 
displays so were important for participants to remember during study.  Participants 
viewed this scene from -45˚ off of the main axis of the floor and 30˚ above the floor plane 
(figure 4.2a).  Furthermore, they could shift their perspective 5˚ side to side and vertically 
with the mouse which allowed participants to view partially obscured pegs as well as give 
more depth to the scene.  Test arrays consisted of two colored circles representing two of 
the four pegs previously presented (figure 4.2c).  Participants moved the outermost dot 
with the mouse to indicate the correct pointing response and clicked to record their 
response.  Reference direction was held constant throughout the experiment and used the 
same instruction and method as the Floor-axis condition from Chapter 3. 
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Procedure 
  Participants studied the four pegs for seven seconds.  All participants were 
instructed to remember the scene from an imagined 0˚ perspective.  This imagined 
perspective shift during encoding dissociates the reference direction from the egocentric 
heading of the observer.  The disparity interaction analysis does not require that 
participants imagine a reference direction outside themselves however, this separation 
may lead participants to encode the scene relative to an intrinsic or allocentric reference 
frame if possible.  Chapter 3 and previous research (Shelton & McNamara, 1997; Shelton 
& McNamara, 2001; McNamara, 2003) suggest that egocentric encoding is a privileged 
spatial encoding.  Therefore, we encouraged intrinsic representations to 1) see if no self 
or external reference point was encoded in spatial memory suggesting object-to-object 
encodings were used and 2) produce a situation where multiple encodings may occur to 
see if there is evidence for multiple representation encoding. 
After learning each display, the participant completed a single test trial. During 
test they were asked to complete a modified judgment of relative direction task where the 
imagined reference direction always remained constant. The test display consisted of two 
items, a center dot, where participants imagined standing, and an outer dot which 
participants imagined pointing to. Participants were instructed to imagine facing the 
instructed 0˚ reference direction while standing at the center dot and point to the outer dot.  
Pointing occurred by moving this outer dot around an orbit and clicking when satisfied.  
Participants were instructed that distance did not matter while responding and only to 
respond as if they were pointing to the orbiting color peg. 
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Analysis 
 Only participants who were able to take the imagined perspective were included 
in the analysis.  In order to determine this, each participant’s signed error was fitted with 
a kernel curve.  A distribution’s peak and overall shape was evaluated as in chapter 3.   
Eight participants had signed errors either centered at their actual perspective (315˚), 
showed a bimodal distribution around both the actual and imagined perspective, or a 
uniform distribution of errors.  These participants were removed from further analysis 
leaving seventeen remaining participants. 
 For each trial, two disparities were calculated based on a reference point of self 
(figure 4.1a) and the center of the virtual floor (figure 4.1b).  For both disparities two 
angles were calculated. Angle A reflects the angle from the reference direction to the 
target object at the encoded reference point.  Angle B is the angle from the reference 
direction to the target object from the response reference object.  For both self disparity 
and environment disparity, angle A is subtracted from angle B.  A disparity of zero 
means both angles are the same and present no interaction in response.  As this disparity 
increases however, larger interactions should occur for an encoded reference point. 
 The purpose of this analysis is to observe how response time and absolute 
pointing error change as these disparities increase.  Therefore, for each participant two 
linear regressions were run, one on RT and the other absolute error.  Both regressions 
included self and environment disparity as factors. The standardized coefficients for each 
factor were then used in a one-sample t-test. If either disparity predicts performance, the 
one sample t-test on that disparity will have a significant effect. Furthermore, if the self 
or environment disparity increase as absolute error and/or response time increases, then 
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that location is a possible reference point for the remembered scene.  However, if objects 
are only encoded as object-to-object relationships, then neither response time nor 
absolute error should increase as disparity increases.  
Results 
Four one sample t-tests were performed to test weather the standardized 
coefficients from the linear regressions were significant. Tests were run for self disparity 
for both the RT and absolute error as well as the environment disparity for both RT and 
absolute error (figure 4.3).  Self disparity did not significance increase as absolute error 
increase (t(24) = 1.51, p = .14) but it did increase as RT increased (t(24) = 4.58, p < .001).  
The reverse was true for environment disparity.  Here as absolute error increase, so did 
environment disparity (t(24) = 2.876, p = .008) but this increase did not occur for RT 
(t(24) = 0.24, p = .81). 
Conclusions  
 Response time increased as self disparity increased while increases were found in 
absolute error with increases in environment disparity increased. This provides evidence 
that both self and the environment reference object were encoded in memory as 
significant interactions were found for both possible reference points.  While the two 
disparities acted on different measures, there is no a priori reason why disparity should 
affect accuracy or speed.  It is possible that there is a reason why these two response 
points target one or the other response measures however equally likely is that these 
effects may appear in either absolute error or RT depending on the subject population and 
their speed/accuracy trade-off.   
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 A pure object-to-object reference point encoding would predict neither of these 
interactions to appear. Therefore a strong claim that only object-to-object encodings 
occur in spatial memory cannot be true. However, it is possible that other reference points 
were found because the intrinsic reference frame was not strong enough given the sparse 
virtual environment presented.  To strengthen the intrinsic reference frame, the following 
experiment increases the salience of the internal layout of objects by making the peg 
positions symmetrical across the primary axes of the floor.  If object-to-object encodings 
only occur under these more salient environmental conditions we would expect the self 
and environment effects to disappear.    
Experiment 7 
Methods 
 Participants 
 Twenty-five new University of Illinois undergraduate students completed the 
experiment for course credit.   
 Materials 
Participants completed the same task as experiment 6 except two peg locations 
were chosen at a random distance from the center of the rectangular floor along an 
oblique angle (figure 4.2b).  These two pegs were then mirrored across the long axis of 
the floor resulting in a symmetrical array.  For test, pairs of pegs were chosen at random 
excluding the mirrored pairs due to the trivial response required.  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to experiment 6. 
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 Data Analysis 
 Each participant’s signed errors were plotted and fit with a kernel curve.  Using 
the same criteria as in Chapter 3, participants were excluded if they did not or could not 
take the imagined 0˚ perspective.   Sixteen participants met this criterion for correct 
instruction following and were included in the further linear regression and one sample t-
test analysis. 
Results 
 As in experiment 6, RT increased as the disparity between the response and 
encoded angle increased with a reference point of self (t(24) = 2.43, p = .022) however no 
increase in absolute error was found (t(24) = 1.39, p = .17). As environment disparity 
increased, absolute error increased (t(24) = 4.06, p < .001). There was a marginal effect 
of RT with external disparity (t(24) = 1.83, p = .08) however this effect is opposite to the 
expected effect.  That is as external disparity increases response time decreases with a 
marginal significance (see figure 4.3). 
Conclusions 
 Changing the symmetry of the array did not substantially change performance.  
Even with a regular array, theoretically increasing the intrinsic reference frame of the 
array, disparity from the encoded representation and response angle increased for both 
the self and external reference point. This evidence suggests reference points other than 
object-to-object relationships exist even when the intrinsic reference direction is stronger.  
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Discussion 
 When encoding reference frames, a reference point and direction are needed to 
code spatial locations.  While reference direction has received the vast majority of study, 
which reference point(s) are remembered in memory has not elicited much study.  In two 
experiments, three possible reference point encodings were tested using an interaction 
paradigm that directly tested two potential reference points, the self and the center of the 
array and indirectly tested object-to-object relations that would predict no effect.  
Experiment 6 found evidence for both an egocentric and an external reference point.  
Experiment 7 presented a stronger array, intrinsic reference frame with symmetrical 
displays and again found evidence for both proposed reference points.   
  The strong model of only object-to-object relationships encoded in spatial 
memory cannot be true.  If the participants had encoded each object’s relation to all other 
objects, responses should be directly recalled from memory resulting in no interaction 
effect between a stored and response representation.  While these experiments cannot 
directly test if object-to-object encoding occurs, they do cast doubt on the necessity of 
this kind of representation since there is evidence for other encoded reference points. 
Two possible options exist given these findings. Spatial memory may encode object 
arrays in multiple ways with object-to-object encoding as well as reference frames with 
other reference points.  Alternatively, egocentric and allocentric reference points alone 
may encode spatial relationships in memory with no need of object-to-object encoding.  
Future study is needed to directly test object-to-object encodings to fully explain 
reference point encoding. 
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 These experiments found direct evidence for two different reference points within 
spatial memory when only one reference point is necessary. Mental translations in spatial 
task are generally precise and accurate compared to other spatial transformations such as 
object rotation.  So why might spatial memory include both of these reference points?  
Egocentric reference points may be crucial to acting on the world.  Picking up a cup on a 
table or navigating to a building requires viewer-centered coordinates.  Even though there 
is a minimal cost to mental transformations required in converting between reference 
points, we may encode these viewer-centric reference points for use when acting in the 
world.  If this is true, then finding the egocentric reference points here is particularly 
interesting.  Participants in this task did not directly act on the objects they remembered 
from their own perspective as they were instructed to take the intrinsic reference direction 
throughout the test.  Therefore, this finding might speak to an automatic encoding of an 
egocentric reference point regardless of final intent.  Since we often encounter scenes 
before deciding what actions, if any, to take, this automatic encoding may be obligatory 
even in cases where participants knew ahead of time they would not act on their own 
viewpoint.   
 However, we also found evidence that we encode a scene with an environment 
reference point. One possible reason for this second encoding is that the environment 
influences the encoding of this reference point.  Even in this sparse virtual world, 
environmental cues from the pegs and floor may influence the encoding of an external 
reference point.  If true, a sparser environment may remove this reference point.  
However, it is also possible that regardless of the environment, some external reference 
point is encoded.  In this case, spatial memory may encode a reference point for other use 
	  76	  
such as identifying objects that may require understanding how multiple parts or objects 
relate to each other. Future studies will be required to fully understand what is and is not 
encoded in spatial memory as well as the full extent of the function of these 
representations.   
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Figures 	  	  
a.  b. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
A large (a) and small (b) object disparity.  Object disparity was calculated as the 
difference between stored and imagined pointing response.  In both cases, the blue 
location represents a possible encoded reference point, the yellow represents the 
imagined translation location during response, while the red dot represents the target 
object. In panel (a), the disparity between encoded pointing response a and calculated 
pointing response b is large while this disparity is smaller in panel (b). 
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Figure 4.2 
Individuals studied an array of pegs located randomly (a, experiment 6) or 
symmetrically (b, experiment 7).  Participants were instructed to remember 
the array as if viewing the scene from a perspective along the imagined 
black arrow.  During study (c) individuals imagined standing at the center 
peg (red) while facing the constant ‘front’ of the scene.  They then used an 
orbiting peg (yellow) to indicate pointing direction. 
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Figure	  4.3	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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS	  	  
In spatial memory, we use reference frames to represent and remember spatial 
locations.  However the nature of this representation has been hotly debated. Information 
comes into the eyes egocentrically so a reasonable hypothesis is that reference frame use 
would be represented egocentrically.  However, as with all other aspects of vision, the 
brain actively interprets the signal it receives so it is possible locations may be 
represented in a viewer-independent way.  Introspectively, our spatial memory often 
seems like a stable map-like representation.  Tolman (1948) wrote about a ‘mental map’ 
that guides the actions of humans and animals and this idea of a mental map seems 
intuitive.  We can reason about objects and their relationship to other objects even when 
we are not near them.  We don’t need to consciously include our own location when 
giving directions to someone.  However, does our ability to complete tasks like these 
mean we must have a mental representation that is independent of our own location? 
Some of the evidence Tolman considers for a mental map is an animal’s ability to 
shortcut.  When rats escaped their mazes, they were able to follow a straight line on the 
roof of their maze to their food reward without any prior experience with this open space 
(Tolman, 1948).  This certainly can be done with a map but does it require a map?   
African ants traverse a very difficult and deadly environment.  They must search 
long distances through the desert for food with the risk that too much time outside the 
nest means death.  These ants are therefore motivated to find food and return home in the 
most efficient way possible given their mental constraints. Ants leave the nest and 
wander in a seemingly random path until they find a food source.  On the return trip 
however, they walk directly home disregarding their original path (Müller & Wehner, 
	  81	  
1988).  This path integration ability has been taken as evidence that the ant is not directly 
representing its path but instead encoding and updating a vector (a distance and direction 
representation) directly home.  The twists and turns the ant takes are not ultimately 
important.  All the ant must do is return home in the most efficient way possible and this 
homing vector can accomplish this goal efficiently. Because shortcutting can be 
accomplished without a mental map, it alone isn’t sufficient to presume allocentric 
mental maps are required for human spatial representations. The sense that we have a 
‘mental map’ might purely be an illusion and when forced to draw a map for directions, 
we transform an egocentric representation into an allocentric map view.   
If allocentric map-like representations can be generated from egocentric mental 
models, what about performance on tasks? Research provided here tries to answer this 
question with three novel methods.  When using a judgment of relative direction task 
(JRD), responses are attracted to an instructed reference direction (chapter 2).  Previous 
research and those presented here does suggest that given time to encode, people can 
fairly accurately represent a location outside of themselves.  In both a near and far 
instruction case, individuals were able to perform accurately and their responses were 
attracted to the instructed encoded reference direction. 
However, if people are able to take a perspective other than their self location, are 
they doing so accurately?  Chapter 3 presented experiments that challenged this idea.  
Even though participants largely took an instructed imagined perspective outside of their 
own viewpoint, they still showed bias towards the self-location while there was no bias 
towards an intrinsic viewpoint when participants were instructed to take their own 
perspective.  
	  82	  
When these experiments were replicated in the real world task from chapter 2 
using the bias analysis in chapter 3, again, participant’s responses biased towards their 
actual viewpoint even when instructed to ignore that self perspective. Even when 
overlapping reference frames strengthened the intrinsic axis of the scene responses were 
pulled by the self position.  Additionally, this experiment makes clear that bias is not just 
an artifact of single trial study on a computer display since the finding was replicated 
when the participant’s were tested on a real world display with strong intrinsic cues. 
Finally, chapter 4 found evidence for both self and environment based reference 
points.  While only a single reference point is necessary it is possible our spatial system 
encodes multiple representations to quickly and accurately respond regardless of the task 
at hand. 
This research suggests that the egocentric reference frame is the default in spatial 
memory.  The egocentric perspective is so strong that it biases performance even when 
people are specifically instructed to take an intrinsic perspective and when no egocentric 
responses are needed.  The nature of this default status however is unclear. Spatial tasks 
often require a direct action on the world. Because of this, the egocentric reference frame 
may always be encoded in memory because it provides the most accurate and fastest 
response for daily tasks.  Alternatively, the egocentric perspective may be the default 
because spatial information enters the brain from an egocentric perspective.   
When spatial transformations are required, the egocentric default may produce a 
biased allocentric or intrinsic reference frame due to an error-prone spatial transformation 
process.  Alternatively, accurate representations of both egocentric and intrinsic reference 
frames may be stored in memory and compete during response. The current research 
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cannot distinguish between these possibilities and further research would be necessary to 
tease apart why we see this persistent self-bias. 
Regardless of why spatial representations contain egocentric information when 
they do not need to, the implications are clear.  When a person needs to complete a task 
that has no relationship to themselves, such as judging the distance between two 
buildings, or whether two cars on the street will hit each other, a person’s position will 
bias their performance.  In normal daily life this bias may be insignificant because people 
are able to correct their actions due to visual feedback or the bias may be small compared 
to the precision required for correct task performance.  However, there are some 
situations where this bias may be harmful.  Driving a car down a highway leaves little 
time for responses and increases the risk of a wrong judgment if biased incorrectly.  
Additionally extreme jobs, such as firefighting, may require both accuracy in judgment 
and speed in execution while understanding the locations between hazards, such as in a 
burning building during a rescue. 
 In addition to understanding better how the human spatial memory system works, 
this research may aid technological advances.  As technologies progress, computers are 
likely to take over more and more tasks for humans.  Understanding the limitations and 
benefits of the human spatial system can guide technology development to aid, and not 
inhibit, a human’s inherent abilities.  This research suggests humans could benefit from 
technology that assists during speeded or precision spatial tasks that require judgments 
outside their own perspective.  This assistance appears less necessary when those same 
judgments involve the individual’s position.  This knowledge can help engineers 
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prioritize their efforts to maximize the helpfulness of new technologies given time and 
cost constraints.   
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